Although Turkey took its initial steps toward establishing democracy in 1950, it has thus far failed to become a fully functioning democracy. Using the comparison cases of Spain and Greece, this paper discusses two related variables that are likely to have thwarted the development of full democracy in Turkey: (1) experience with authoritarian rule and (2) elite settlement or convergence toward acceptance of the democratic rules of the game.
1 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, 'What Democracy Is … and Is Not,' Ch. 4 in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univerity Press, 1996), pp. 49-62. 2 Party closures appeared to be becoming less frequent in recent years; however, the Constitutional Court's relatively recent (11 December 2009) decision to close the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party incited new debates on the democratic standards in Turkey (see http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/turkey-kurdsunrest.1y0 and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8413940.stm). . He then allowed investigation of 8 applications out of 210 (3 percent). Also noted in that same EU report is that 'the Turkish legal framework still fails to provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression and, as a result, is often interpreted in a restrictive way by public prosecutors and judges' (available at established democracies, with high-ranking military officials in the modern day continuing to periodically making public pronouncements about major issues of the day, at times implying that force will be used to produce policy change. Moreover, the recent events associated with the 'Ergenekon' organization, which is alleged to be an ultranationalist organization with ties to the military and to have been plotting an overthrow of the government, indicate at the very least that there is large-scale belief within Turkey that a democratically elected government can indeed still be overthrown by the military. In short, the periodic party closures, restrictions on freedom of speech and military pronouncements make it clear that democracy is not fully established in Turkey. 5 In stark contrast, while some may question the quality of democracy in countries like Spain and Greece, 6 that they are fully functioning democracies is no longer in doubt.
In Similarly, in Greece, the adoption of the 1975 Constitution after the collapse of a 7-year http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_en.pdf, last accessed 1 December 2010, p. 18 of the report). We would like to thank Güçlü Akyürek from the Law Faculty of Galatasaray University, Istanbul, for bringing this to our attention. 5 See, for instance, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, last accessed 1 December 2010. 6 See Leonardo Morlino, Democracy Between Consolidation and Crisis: parties, groups and citizens in Southern Europe, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
regime of colonels may be said to mark the beginning of the Greek transition to democracy, although as discussed below, the legitimacy of the Greek Constitution was initially in greater doubt than was the case in Spain. As in Spain, the election of a centreleft government, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), in 1981 seemed to be a strong indicator that Greece had established a fully functioning democracy.
7
This paper seeks to explain why Turkey has failed to become a fully functioning democracy by comparing it to the relatively more successful cases of Spain and Greece.
The authors assume that historical processes which may be difficult to capture with large-N analyses must be explored in order to gain a better understanding of why Turkey has not yet become a fully functioning democracy. The argument in this paper is thus based on a small-N analysis, using the general approach of Mill's Method of Difference, or
Przeworski and Teune's Most Similar Systems 8 , whereby the dependent variable varies across observations while the independent variables are held constant to the greatest extent possible. In this design, the potential independent variables that do vary across observations are amongst the likely causes of differences across the observations. Thus, the cases of Spain and Greece have been chosen because they are similar to Turkey on a number of key dimensions. These important similarities are outlined in the next section and the subsequent sections highlight the key differences that we argue are likely to have produced differences in regime type across the three countries. These differences revolve around the inter-connected phenomena of experiences with authoritarian rule and elite 7 The election of Socialist governments was significant in both countries because of the extreme hostility on the part of previous authoritarian governments to socialists and other leftist movements. The election of left-wing governments in both cases without violent opposition from the right thus indicated an acceptance that these groups had a right to compete freely in elections and to form a government if they won a majority of seats in parliament. 8 The most recent coup in Greece was in 1967, with the overthrow of a civilian government being presented as an attempt by a virulently anti-communist military to prevent a communist overthrow, although the real reasons for the coup appear to be far more complicated than this. 30 In both of these countries there was also serious concern about continued military interventions after their transitions to democracy in the mid-1970s, with reports and rumours of plots for coups coming to light through the early 1980s in
Greece and the 1990s in Spain. 31 Despite the clear danger of military intervention in politics in these two countries, they managed to become fully functioning democracies. 32 As noted above, some may question the quality of democracy in these countries (see Morlino), but given that it is questionable as to whether Turkey can be counted amongst the Southern European democracies in the first place, a comparison of the quality of democracy seems inappropriate in the present analysis. regime would eventually be required to come to terms with in establishing and stabilizing democratic institutions. 34 Thus, we contend that the factors outlined above-economic development, relations with the EEC/EU, historical problems with military interventionism, and political violence-are unlikely to have caused the differences in regime type in the three countries. Instead, this paper considers two potential alternative explanations for differences in the establishment of fully functioning democracy across the three countries: experience with authoritarian rule and elite settlement or convergence toward acceptance of the democratic rules of the game. We discuss each of these in turn, highlighting the nature of authoritarian rule in the 20 th Century which is likely to have (or in the case of Turkey, have not) led to elite settlement or convergence in our three cases.
We then discuss some of the key aspects of elite settlement and convergence that are likely to have produced differences in the functioning of democracy across the three countries.
Difference 1: Experience with Authoritarian Rule
Although periods of extremely repressive rule do not necessarily produce the 'right' configuration of attitudes to guarantee stable democracy, in countries where citizens and elites have started to engage in a democratic form of government and experience rising expectations regarding continued democratization, periods of authoritarian rule are likely 34 We acknowledge that the Spanish Civil War was on a much larger scale than the leftwing and fascist/right-wing violence in Greece and Turkey, but merely wish to highlight the similarities in the nature of disputes and the existence of large-scale political violence across all three regimes. The impact of differences in civil war conditions across the three countries may deserve further exploration in future research, though.
to be anachronistic. Particularly where there are civilian elites who have organized political parties and participated in democratic rule, repression seems likely to create a situation in which 'the democrats' realize cooperation amongst them will produce mutual benefits. That is, opposition elites in such regimes are often able to unify in their deepseated opposition to repression, with opposition to the authoritarian regime itself serving as a basis for cooperation. The historical memory of an authoritarian regime may also serve to continue to ensure conciliatory behaviour and support for the basic rules of the democratic regime. In the absence of an extremely repressive regime and the memory of such a regime, it may be more difficult for political elites to unify to try to guarantee the continued existence of their democracy. (Maravall 1978; Preston 1976 Preston , 1995 . 37 In addition, Franco's regime was extremely lengthy, lasting for more than thirty-five years.
It can thus be argued that the period of war and subsequent state violence against the population and segments of the political elite had a substantial impact on the Spanish population and its post-Franco leadership, which was likely to affect their attitudes and behaviour during the post-Franco settlement period to be discussed below.
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The post-civil war regime in Greece, although less brutal than the war itself, was nonetheless fairly repressive. The Greek public was officially divided into those deemed to be 'nationally-minded' (noncommunists who were judged to be loyal to the regime) or
'not nationally-minded' (communists, family members of suspected or actual communists, and some centrists or centre-leftists who were deemed to be 'fellow travellers'). The latter were ineligible for professional licences, employment in the civil service, driver's licences, passports, or university entrance. Martial law courts could prosecute communists and other leftists, including those from the centre-left, as well as those of more centrist views, and sentence them to death, and there was systematic surveillance of hundreds of thousands of citizens. Elections were regularly held, but the regime clearly had illiberal elements. 39 A military regime was then established in 1967 which lasted until 1974. In the colonels' regime, civil servants and school and university teachers whose allegiance was in doubt were dismissed. Lawyers and judges who showed too much independence were harassed and dismissed. The press was censored and students were subjected to brutality. 40 Leaders of resistance groups were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and rather than targeting one part of the political spectrum, the colonels repressed individuals from most of the political spectrum. 41 The worst and most visible act of brutality came in November 1973 when students occupied Athens
Polytechnic and university buildings in Salonika and Patras. Coup leader and post-coup Prime Minister (and eventually President) Georgios Papadopoulos sent in troops and tanks to crush the students; this was apparently carried out with extreme brutality and at least 34 students and others were killed, hundreds of others were wounded and almost a thousand arrested. 42 The treatment of the students in Athens and other locations was met with extreme revulsion, and although not on the scale of the brutality carried out in the early Franco regime, this, along with the lengthy period of repression after the civil war-Greece was ruled by repressive regimes for more than twenty-five years-may have been enough to convince citizens and civilian opposition from all political leanings that an authoritarian regime was to be avoided at all costs in the future. 43 The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 did actually foresee a parliamentary monarchy. However the only period in the 20 th century that this constitution could be said to be in effect was between 1908 and 1913. The 1908 elections were considerably free, and the following year the constitution would be amended so as to limit some of the Sultan's competences (including his right to dissolve the parliament). were determined to restructure all the essential institutions so as to make Turkey a fairly illiberal 'democracy' where freedoms of expression and association would be limited. In Ahmad's words, 'all political life came to a standstill as the political parties were closed down and former politicians banned from participating in politics. Before some semblance of political life was restored, 44 Turkey's institutions -the constitution, the electoral law, the universities -were radically amended so as to depoliticise the In the Republican era, two brief multi-party periods were experienced in 1924-5 and 1930. The first one was marked by the formation of an opposition party against the RPP, founder of the Republic, by a group of dissident political elites of both civilian and military origins. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, did not tolerate this move and the opposition party was closed in 1925. However in 1930 it was Mustafa Kemal who encouraged the formation of an opposition party. Having attracted a large amount of support from discontented masses, this new party would soon be regarded as a threat to the new regime and be forced to dissolve itself. 44 This would start with the 6 November 1983 election in which only 3 parties were allowed by the military regime to participate. country'. 45 The coup had severe consequences: 650,000 people were taken into custody, 57 We acknowledge the explanatory limitations of the elite settlement approach but contend here that it provides extremely useful analytical (if somewhat descriptive) tools for understanding the failure of Turkey to become a fully functioning democracy.
convergence, while Turkey represents a case of elite disunity, particularly lack of settlement and lack of gradual convergence. Given the potential importance of this variable in explaining the differences in regime type across the three cases, it is worth exploring further how and why the three countries differ on this variable.
The events surrounding the elite settlement in Spain have been outlined by other scholars, 58 but a few of the key points deserve to be revisited here, given their stark contrast with events in Greece and Turkey. In Spain, previously warring factions from the 1931-36 republican period and subsequent civil war were initially stopped by the Franco regime, and his death opened up the possibility of a more permanent settlement across these groups. Such a settlement was far from inevitable, however, and several alternative approaches after Franco's death were possible. King Juan Carlos and the elite he put in charge of the transition, Adolfo Suárez, however, appeared to realize that the best hope for permanent peace and stability was a settlement, with any alternative perceived as likely to produce significant elite and civil unrest and perhaps a return to the levels of violence experienced during the civil war. Suárez also seemed to realize that the best hope for settlement would be via private discussions with elites who had the potential to disrupt the transition and to cause serious problems of governance if not included. This approach began prior to any official discussion of a constitutional settlement, and focused on discussions with the major opposition, who had already begun to make demands for the legalization of all parties and had begun to form a provisional government (and had also organized public demonstrations and strikes). 59 Early on, Suárez began negotiating with these elites and also with representatives of the right prior to drafting the Law for 58 See, for instance Gunther (1992) . 59 Gunther whom had been considered to be enemies of the regime only a few years before this.
These friendly relations continued across party lines in negotiations over the constitution and the regional autonomy statutes as well. 63 The only issue that could not be dealt with completely in this way was the issue of the Basques, although agreements were eventually developed and most of the Basque political factions have pledged loyalty to the Spanish constitution and renounced armed conflict.
The process by which elites were transformed from disunity to consensual unity in Greece is in contrast to the Spanish process. Given the violence of the Greek civil war, the subsequent distinction drawn between 'nationally minded' versus 'suspect' citizens (anti-communist versus communist), and the severe repression of the left carried out by the right-wing government after the civil war via 'loyalty boards' and martial law courts, it would be expected that some sort of reconciliation would be required before Greece could establish a fully functioning, stable democracy. During the rule of the colonels several attempts at developing an anti-dictatorship unity were, in fact, attempted but these generally failed due to personal animosities and suspicion between the left and right, 64 thus making the possibility of a negotiated transition like Spain's unlikely.
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The 1974 transition to democracy in Greece was extremely abrupt, was dominated by a single partisan individual-Constantine Karamanlis-and in contrast to Suárez's approach in Spain, this transition leader did not attempt any formal or informal negotiations between elites. Even the decision regarding who would lead the transition to 63 Gunther 'Spain: the very...', p. 54. 64 Karakatsanis, pp. 47-51. 65 It is contended, however, that although these talks failed to produce a unified solution to rule of the colonels, the face-to-face contacts between previously warring elites served to create a sense of unity and mutual civility between them, and these helped to build mutual trust and respect between civilian politicians (Karakatsanis, pp. 7-8).
democracy-initially reached via discussions amongst elites-was ultimately made in a less-than-negotiated manner that had the potential to provoke suspicion and hostility.
That is, once the military decided to hand power back to civilians (after being embarrassed by failed mobilization efforts against Turkey), the civilian leadership from the right and centre-right and several military officers decided that the leader of the National Radical Union (Kanellopoulos) should lead the transitional coalition government. The new government was due to be sworn in three hours after this decision was made but during this short period, the agreement was broken by a smaller group of the negotiators who decided-without informing the others-that Karamanlis should be invited to lead the transition government. Moreover, the members of the constituent assembly who remained for the entirety of the debate did not have time to finish discussing all of the articles of the constitution because Karamanlis had stipulated that debate would be limited to three months and refused to negotiate this stipulation. 68 The difference between this process and the careful crossparty negotiations in Spain could hardly be starker.
Not surprisingly, the main opposition party leader in Greece, Andreas Papandreou (PASOK), denounced the constitution, arguing that many of its provisions-particularly those regarding executive power-were 'totalitarian'. He also initially claimed that if his party were to win enough seats to form a government in future elections, he would dissolve parliament and hold elections for a new constituent assembly to write a new up to the election, as noted above. Thus, the main party of the left had begun to moderate.
In addition, although the Communists-also a relatively popular movement in Greeceopposed the electoral system imposed on them and opposed many aspects of the new constitution, the party still pledged in 1974 to adhere to democratic, parliamentary government. 71 Thus, by 1981, there was widespread acceptance of the democratic rules established by Karamanlis, both on the part of the public and on the part of elites.
Karakatsanis points out that the Greek case indicates that radical anti-constitution rhetoric does not necessarily translate into semi-or disloyal behaviour (Karakatsanis, pp.
131-32). Such rhetoric can be used mostly to attempt to win votes and/or because it is perceived that this is simply the way that the opposition should behave; Andreas
Papandreou's failure to change the constitution and his gradual dropping of language signifying that he would do so indicates that gradual convergence may indeed occur.
Thus, Greece appears to represent a two-step model of elite convergence: Karamanlis and New Democracy managed to dominate the transition and early period of Greek democracy and while the main opposition, PASOK, initially appeared to oppose the institutions of this new democracy, it seemed to realize that it would have to moderate in order to avoid the position of being a permanent loser in the new regime. This convergence, in turn, provided a degree of stability to Greek institutions that would likely ward off attempts at overthrow-although as noted above, there were still rumours of such plots. The fact that these did not come to fruition may thus be a strong indicator of the widespread acceptance and legitimacy of Greek democratic institutions, which would make an overthrow extremely difficult indeed. 71 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
Karakatsanis's analysis also indicates that for this particular method of achieving elite consensual unity via gradual convergence to succeed, (a) the person or group leading the transition must have widespread legitimacy and (b) democracy must be seen by elites and the masses as the only option available (whether due to international circumstances, memory of brutality, experience with a poorly functioning authoritarian regime etc.).
The case of Turkey represents neither one of elite settlement prior to the launch of a new democratic regime nor gradual convergence. Instead, the Turkish case appears to be marked by elite disunity, as defined above. After the 1960 military coup in Turkey, a new constitution which was more liberal than the previous one was drafted by a Constitutive Assembly and ratified by public vote. The way that assembly came into existence and debates surrounding the new constitution were democratic to some extent.
However the constitution-making process in 1961 had a crucial deficiency too: members and supporters of the Democrat Party (DP), the former governing party which was overthrown by the junta that carried out the coup, were excluded from the entire process. which other major (and minor) parties were also allowed to compete freely would seem to lend far more legitimacy to the rules and procedures designed by Karamanlis and his advisers than was the case with the 1961 Turkish constitution.
The making of the post-coup 1982 Turkish constitution was even less democratic than the 1961 Constitution's design process. In the latter case, most of the members of the Constitutive Assembly were elected -though not with direct elections or universal suffrage. 74 In addition, in cases of discord between the civilian ('Representatives'
Assembly') and military ('Committee of National Union') branches of the Constitutive Assembly, a mixed commission consisting of members from both branches, or the civilian branch per se, was prescribed to prevail. 75 However during the 1982 constitutionmaking process, the military branch ('Council of National Security') of the Constitutive
Assembly had an undisputed supremacy over the civilian branch ('Consultative Assembly'). All members of the Consultative Assembly were appointed by the military, and none of them were members of any party. Indeed all political parties and party members from the pre-coup period were excluded from participating in this process and banned from politics for several years after the coup. The final draft of the 1982
Constitution would be introduced to popular vote for ratification, however criticising it was forbidden. 76 Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu contend that democratic constitution-making principles comprise free public opinion, freedom for political parties, elected assemblies and democratic representation, and free elections, and these authors posit that the Spanish and Greek democratic transitions in the 1970s were in conformity with democratic principles.
However, in their view, the methods practiced in Turkey after the 1980 military coup fell short of the these principles and are therefore closer to the constitution-making models experienced in Pakistan, Albania, and some Latin American countries. In this respect, they stress that the high level of the 'yes' votes at the 1982 referendum on the Turkish constitution does not necessarily imply the presence of a strong, voluntary and conscious social approval behind the Turkish Constitution.
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Thus, the Turkish case follows neither the Spanish nor Greek models. Elites have neither had the opportunity to develop a lasting cross-party settlement nor have they gradually converged toward acceptance of any particular regime rules designed by a popular, elected government. In contrast, in the Greek case of gradual convergence, the constitution was designed by a very popular leader who had been elected by the Greek public, with no limitations imposed on opposition participation in these elections. While the Constitution was not designed in a consensual manner, it was at least designed by a leader whose party had clear public support. In Turkey, both the 1961 and 1982
Constitutions were designed by groups of elites who did not necessarily have public support, as the public was not directly consulted except to ratify the documents produced by the assemblies. Thus it has been possible for almost all elites to question the settlements, and in the instance of the 1982 settlement, the document produced was far from democratic in any case. 78 The lack of settlement or elite convergence toward a set of democratic rules has implications for political stability and particularly the role of the 77 Tanör and Yüzbaşıoğlu, pp. 37-8. 78 Elite settlement may, of course, not guarantee democracy and instead could produce an authoritarian settlement. However, given the configuration of interests in Turkey, this sort of settlement seems extremely unlikely. Thus it appears that any movement toward elite unity in acceptance of the basic rules of the regime will revolve around democratic rules rather than authoritarian rules. experienced in Greece appears to have had a similar effect. In Turkey, on the other hand, the failure to develop an elite settlement on key issues-including the functioning of Turkish democratic institutions, the very controversial issue of the role of religion and rights of religious groups, and the treatment of ethnic minority groups-has meant elite disagreement on the basic rules of the regime and unwillingness to defend democratic rules (particularly since they played no role in creating them in the first place). This, in turn, has meant that civilian elites have been less willing or able to amass the power required to counter the military threat. They have also had more difficulty in converging toward a general acceptance of the meaning of-and acceptable limitations on-free speech, which has significant implications for respect for the latter in Turkey.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that experience with authoritarian rule and elite settlement or convergence are likely to be key explanations for the differences in regime type between Spain and Greece, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other. The former two countries experienced violent civil wars followed by years of repression, experiences which are likely to have had a significant impact on the historical memory of elites and masses, making them more prone to try to avoid repeating these circumstances. In this respect, it should be acknowledged that the Civil War in Spain may be just as important as the Franco dictatorship in determining the behaviour of Spanish elites. Turkey has also experienced conditions approaching civil war but these experiences were generally halted by military interventions involving relatively limited brutality and repression. The elites and 'ordinary' cadres of the mainstream political parties in Turkey were rarely harmed in times of military intervention, whereas elites of all political persuasions were repressed in Greece's most recent experience with authoritarian rule (the regime of the colonels).
Thus, in Spain and Greece, when democracy has failed, the consequences have been quite severe (especially so in Spain); in Turkey, when democracy has failed, the military has served as a welcome stabilizer. This outcome is positive in the sense that the level of human suffering is likely to have been reduced in Turkey; however, it may be one of the factors that has made it unnecessary for elites to attempt to settle their differences to try to make democracy work.
As noted above, one of the key failures in terms of elite settlement or convergence Similarly, the Kurdish question continues to stand out as a factor which has made full democracy difficult to achieve in Turkey. Spain had to deal with a comparable problem, the Basque question, both before and after its transition to democracy (and particularly increased Basque violence around the time of the transition). This may be roughly comparable to Turkey's Kurdish problem. However two crucial differences between the two cases remain: the Basque Country is more developed than much of the rest of Spain whereas the Kurdish populated parts of Turkey are the poorest regions of the country. Second, ETA's insurgency caused the death of less than a thousand people in Spain while it is estimated that more than 30,000 people lost their lives in Turkey due to the PKK's rebellion. The impacts of these differences on democracy are clearly worth exploration in future research.
Nevertheless, we contend that our findings still have clear implications for ongoing attempts to establish stable democracy in Turkey. Although the EU is attempting to use 'carrots and sticks' to pull and push Turkey toward democracy, its success has thus far has been fairly limited. Our findings indicate that the EU's approach may not be that helpful because of the failure of any real elite settlement or convergence toward acceptance of any particular set of democratic rules. Until such settlement or convergence occurs, it seems unlikely that Turkey will move significantly forward in meeting the EU's political requirements for full membership. however. As argued in this paper, lack of such reform may create a serious stumbling block on Turkey's road to finally creating a fully functioning democracy. Thus, it seems that, as argued by Grigoriadis, 79 some consensus between the conservative Islamists and the secularists must be achieved to resolve social divisions in Turkey and ultimately to develop a fully functioning democracy in Turkey.
